

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0143

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES

REF: (A) MBFR VIENNA 54

(B) MBFR VIENNA 55

(C) STATE 135640

1. AS INSTRUCTED BY WASHINGTON, THE DELEGATION HAS DEVELOPED WITH THE AHG A PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ADJUSTING THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES. AHG HAS APPROVED THE PAPER AND SENT IT TO NATO UNDER COVER OF A MESSAGE REQUESTING COUNCIL GUIDANCE BY SEPTEMBER 16 (MBFR VIENNA 133 AND 134).

2. AS REPORTED SEPTELS, THERE WAS MAJORITY SUPPORT IN AHG THAT, IN VIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED POSITION, MATTER SHOULD BE REFERRED TO
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COUNCIL FOR DECISION. IT WAS CONSIDERED UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT

COUNCIL ACTION BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATING ROUND, HENCE SUGGESTED DEADLINE WAS SET FOR THE BEGINNING OF NEXT ROUND.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, AHG CONCLUDED THAT THERE IS AN IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENT FOR THE ALLIES TO GIVE THE EAST A SIGNAL DURING THE CURRENT ROUND THAT EAST EAST CRITICISMS OF THE ALLIED GROUND FORCE DEFINITION HAD BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY. AHG THEREFORE AGREED TO INFORM THE COUNCIL THAT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FUTURE COUNCIL DECISION, IT WOULD INDICATE TO THE EAST THAT ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER THE APPLICATION OF THEIR DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WITH A VIEW TO DEALING WITH SOME OF THE INCONSISTENCIES TO WHICH THE EAST HAS CALLED ATTENTION.

4. DELEGATION CONSIDERS THAT EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDE AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH SUCH AN INTERIM APPROACH TO THE EAST IN THE INFORMAL SESSION ENVISAGED FOR JULY 17. TALKING POINTS WOULD BE DEVELOPED BY THE AHG STRICTLY ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED IN PARA 4 OF THE AHG COVERING MESSAGE TO THE NAC.

5. LOOKING TOWARD SPECIFIC DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS TO DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES WHICH WOULD BE INITIATED WITH THE EAST IN THE NEXT NEGOTIATING ROUND, WE BELIEVE IT NOW TIMELY FOR WASHINGTON TO DECIDE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF AN ALLIED APPROACH TO INSTRUCT USNATO ACCORDINGLY. THE RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, INsofar AS THEY ARE AVAILABLE TO US HERE, DO NOT APPEAR TO ADD ANY NEW ELEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT INADVISABLE TO APPROACH THE EAST WITH THE PROPOSED REVISION TO THE ALLIED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES.

6. AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH AN APPROACH, IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE ALTERNATIVES DEVELOPED IN THE AHG REPORT TO NAC ARE IDENTICAL IN SUBSTANCE WITH CASES 1 AND 2 OUTLINED IN EARLIER DELEGATION RECOMMENDATION TO WASHINGTON (REF B). HOWEVER, UNLIKE THAT MESSAGE, WHICH RECOMMENDED ADOPTION OF CASE 1, AHG REPORT TO NAC AVOIDS MAKING ANY SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS. WHILE THE AHG WANTED TO GO ON RECORD THAT

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FURTHER VARIANTS WERE POSSIBLE, IT WAS IN FACT NOT ABLE TO DEVELOP ANY VARIANTS OTHER THAN CASE 3, WHICH WAS DEEMED PREJUDICIAL TO ALLIED INTERESTS. (DURING DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT, US REP REFERRED TO DOD STUDY WHICH HAD EXAMINED SEVEN OPTIONS, AND CALLED ATTENTION OF AHG TO FACT THAT STUDY HAD CONCLUDED THAT ONLY TWO OF THESE OPTIONS -- THOSE WHICH ADDRESSED EXCLUDING EITHER NO-US/SOVIET AREA

AIR DEFENSE OR ALL AREA AIR DEFENSE -- WERE REALISTIC
NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES.)

7. DELEGATION CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT CASE 1 IS
TACTICALLY THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS APPROACH. ACCORDINGLY,
WE AGAIN RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON APPROVE CASE 1
AND SEEK ALLIED AGREEMENT TO IT THROUGH THE NAC.

8. OUR REASONS FOR PREFERRING CASE 1 OVER CASE 2
ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CASE 1 DEALS ONLY WITH THOSE ANOMALIES WHICH
THE EAST HAS ACUTALLY RAISED: NAMELY, THE GROUND
ELEMENTS OF THE POLISH AND CZECH NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE
ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE PACT PERSONNEL WHO MAN GROUND
SUPPORT HELICOPTER UNITS. CASE 2, ON THE OTHER HAND,
WOULD ALSO DEAL WITH US AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSE
PERSONNEL, TO WHOSE INCLUSION IN THE GROUND FORCE
TOTALS THE EAST HAS NOT OBJECTED.

B. CASE 1 ADJUSTS THE PACT TOTAL ONLY, NOT THE
NATO TOTAL. MOREOVER, THE ADJUSTMENTS GO IN A
DIRECTION WHICH THE EAST WOULD REGARD AS FAVORABLE.
ITS NEGOTIATING IMPACT WOULD THEREFORE BE GREATER.

C. CASE 1 DOES NOT EXCLUDE ANY SOVIET FORCES
FROM THE PACT REDUCTION BASE. IT IS IN THE ALLIED
INTEREST TO FOCUS REDUCTIONS IN BOTH PHASES AS MUCH
AS POSSIBLE ON SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THE
SOVIET FORCES EXCLUDED UNDER CASE 2 ARE CLEARLY
GROUND FORCES. THEIR EXCLUSION COULD CREATE AN
UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT. AND IT COULD AGGRAVATE THE
NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROBLEM, IN THAT THE EXCLUDED
FORCES WOULD BE THE ONLY SOVIET GROUND FORCES NOT
SUBJECT TO THE COMMON CEILING LIMITATION.

D. THE IMPACT OF CASE 1 IN REDUCING THE GAP
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WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY APPARENT TO THE EAST, WITHOUT
THE NEED TO DISCUSS ADDITIONAL DATA. THE EASTERN
REDUCTION BASE WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED. UNDER CASE 2,
ON THE OTHER HAND, BECAUSE BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN
REDUCTION BASES ARE REDUCED, THE NET IMPLICATIONS
WOULD BECOME EVIDENT TO EAST ONLY AFTER DETAILED
FIGURES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED AND DISCUSSED WITH THEM.

E. CASE 1 WOULD NOT REQUIRE BOTH SIDES TO AGREE ON DEFINITIONS
FOR TWO NEW AGREED SUB-CATEGORIES OF ORGANIC GROUND
FORCE AIR DEFENSE AND AREA AIR DEFENSE AND TO DECIDE
WHICH SPECIFIC UNITS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO THOSE
CATEGORIES. CASE 2 WOULD RAISE THESE
DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS WHILE HAVING ABOUT THE SAME
EFFECT ON THE GAP AS CASE 1.

F. IT IS TRUE THAT UNDER CASE 1, ALLIED REDUCTIONS

NEEDED TO REACH THE SUGGESTED 700,000 COMMON CEILING
LEVEL WOULD SLIGHTLY EXCEED 10 PERCENT OF OVERALL ALLIED
GROUND FORCES MANPOWER. CASE 2, ON THE OTHER HAND,
WOULD FURTHER AGGREGATE THE PROBLEM OF FITTING IN
ALLIED REDUCTIONS UNDER THE AGREED TOTAL. SEE
SEPTTEL FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT. RESOR

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